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This article analyzes international business cycles in Europe 1862-1913 us-
ing disaggregated data and Dynamic Factor Analysis. In comparison with
estimates of real national product there is more evidence for international
business cycles in disaggregated data of Germany, France and Great Britain
before World War I. This is because data used to construct historical national
accounts are often not sucient to date business cycles. Especially, general
price 
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11 Introduction
The analysis of international business cycle comovement has lately received little
impetus from economic history research. In the light of the recent world economic
crisis, however, the demand for answers from this research discipline has increased.1
In order to correctly understand the causes of crises one of the key features one has
to know if downturns are of national or international nature, and which institutions
are likely to foster or prevent common business cycles. Given a normative consensus
about the favored degree of cyclical comovement political eort could lead to a better
design of economic institutions.
History could be a good test for which institutions lead to closer economic 
uc-
tuations. Especially the data from the time of classical gold standard (1880-1914)
could provide some valuable insights, because this period seems to be good example
of institutions leading to conformity between nation's ups and downs.2 In times of
the classical gold standard, economies were characterized by stable prices, 
exible
labor markets, innovative corporations and little government spending. Further-
more, stable exchange rates, high factor mobility and well-developed commodity
market integration were features of that period. However, while this should be
paired with high international output correlation, at least between the industri-
alized core of Europe, empirical evidence shows mostly the opposite (Backus and
Kehoe 1992, A'Hearn and Woitek 2001, Haroon, Simonelli, and Surico 2009). So
what is wrong, theory or evidence?3
The evidence on international business cycles for the 19th century stems usually
from historical national accounting. When it comes to national accounting errors
before World War I, the simple lack of trustworthy data is one of the main culprits.
Indeed, national product estimations may include more noise than signal.4 They
are therefore ill-suited to reconcile the contradicting thoughts and observations on
19th century international business cycles. This paper uses a dynamic factor model
to analyze historical international business cycles. It demonstrates that most of
cyclical 
uctuations before World War I had an international character and therefore
conrms the theoretical considerations favoring strong international business cycle
comovement during the classical gold standard.
Using estimations about national accounts to determine cyclical comovement is
a questionable approach due to both lack of data and adequate aggregation meth-
ods. Uebele and Ritschl assume that a nancial market index for Germany for the
period 1870-1913 provides a better indicator for cyclical movement than any of the
four estimations of National Net Product (NNP), which dier among each other
1 An important sign is the great interest in Barry Eichengreen's and Kevin O'Rourke's
blog, which compares macroeconomic indicators between the 1930s and today. See
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3421
2 Flandreau and Maurel (2005) show the relation between monetary unions and business-cycles.
3 Baldwin and Martin (1999) warn against exaggerating the similarity between the rst and
second globalization. However, the dierences they point to do not solve the contradiction found
here.
4~ Note that in the interest of readability, the dierent types of national accounting are grouped
under the umbrella term \national product," even if national income is actually meant. I further
discuss denitions and calculation methods in the chapter 3.
1signicantly (Homann 1965, Homann and M uller 1959, Uebele and Ritschl 2009),
and use the stock index as a benchmark to discriminate between them. This shows
that the choice beween dierent estimations for the same national aggregate itself
must have a great in
uence on the level of correlation between international business
cycles. Doubtless, this problem is not limited to German data but also aects other
countries in a similar way.5
Furthermore, Uebele and Ritschl (2009, p. 46) point to the fact that the cyclical
characteristics of price data contribute massively to the problem above as they
illustrate by a comparison of nominal and real NNP estimations. Since Homann's
and Homann/M uller's original datasets in nominal prices were de
ated ex-post
Burhop and Wol (2005), the huge discrepancies between turning points of those
series in real prices almost disappear if the series are compared in nominal prices
(Uebele and Ritschl 2009, p. 47).6 One possible solution to handle such problems
is the construction of better de
ators. Unfortunately, this requires a collection
of new data and the probability of success is not necessarily high. In contrast,
using single series directly for dating business cycles aggregated by a statistical
procedure appears to have a higher rate of return. For some countries, this method
has been successfully applied already(Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen 2005, Grabas
1992, Sarferaz and Uebele 2009, Spree 1977).
With contemporary US data, better performance of dynamic factor models based
on disaggregated time series compared to national accounting could be shown, es-
pecially for nowcasting the current state of the economy, which is rendered dicult
by regular data revisions (Stock and Watson 1998, Otrok and Whiteman 1998). A
further application of the technique to modern data is Br ummerho and Gr omling
(2010), where the author shows that the 1998 version of nominal West Germany's
GDP between 1970 and 1990 diers substantially from its 2006 revision. Addition-
ally, Ciccone and Jarocinski (2009) indicate that dient versions of income estima-
tions in the Penn World Tables heavily in
uence the determinats of economic growth
of 67 countries.
There are some works analyzing international business cycle comovement using
dynamic factor models; however on the basis of national accounting data (Kose,
Otrok, and Whiteman 2003, Haroon, Simonelli, and Surico 2009). For periods with-
out national accounting, the value of such analyses is limited: even the best method
cannot produce reliable results using bad data. So far, there is only one interna-
tional analyses using the disaggregate approach for Latin America countries (Aiol,
Catao, and Timmermann 2006) but none that addresses the puzzle of gold standard
members and their alleged business cycle correlation. By using data for France,
Germany and Great Britain, this paper carries out that approach. It explains the
method, discusses the results and relates them to previous research.
5 France: L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990), Toutain (1997); Great Britain: Feinstein's
estimations based on the income and expenditure accounts Feinstein (1972); USA: Balke and
Gordon (1989a), Romer (1989).
6 Note that use the term \turning point" not in its strict mathematic sense; i. e. where the
second derivative equals zero. Instead, I use it in the more common sense of peaks and troughs,
or, in the language of dierential calculus, where the rst derivative equals zero.
22 The Model
The method is a so-called dynamic factor model (DFM). The basic motivation to
use it is similar to that of using diusion indices (Burns and Mitchell 1946), but it
diers in the statistical rigor.7 Both methods use time series from various sectors
of the economy as indicators for aggregate economic performance. Due to progress
in time series econometrics, however, a proper formalization was introducted to
quantitative macroeconomics in the late 1980s (Stock and Watson (1989), Stock
and Watson (1991) and Stock and Watson (1998), but see also Sargent and Sims
(1977)).
Trying to construct national accounting aggregates with historical time series
leads often to unsatisfactory results for business cycle analysis, because these series
do not match the strict criteria for national accounts. In contrast, DFMs are able
to accomodate series such as the number of letters posted per year (Gerlach and
Gerlach-Kristen 2005). Economic reasoning suggests that such series contain valu-
able information about the state of the economy, but formal restrictions dictate that
not all of them can be used in classical national statistics. In rare data environments,
DFMs are therefore often more ecient in exploiting scarce data resources.
When Burns and Mitchell (1946) performed their analysis, most time series were
analyzed by experts. The use of computers to perform that task has doubtlessly in-
creased the speed and reliability of the research, but the necessary formal procedures
also led to a more abstract approach and therefore increased the approach's trans-
parency. The computer scans the time series for their common component and then
decomposes each series in a common and variable-specic part. While the common
component or the \factor" describes the common movements of all series, the spe-
cic component one characterizes the varying component . Thus the metalworking
industry could be positively aected by a booming economy (common factor), but
could deviate from overall trend through bad management (specic component).
The decomposition is
yit = ift + uit (1)
where yit re
ects the value of the series i at point of time t, and ft re
ects the
common component.8 In consequence, uit is the residual that equals the specic
component for series i. i is a series-specic weight that designates the level of
correlation between the factor and every series yit.
The model assumes an autoregressive process for the dynamics of the common
component, so that the current value of a series is determined by its past values:
ft = 1ft 1 + 2ft 2 + ::: + qft q + t (2)
ft is the actual index value of economic activity and ft 1, ft 2, ... ft n are its past
values. 1;2;:::;q are unknown parameters, describing the dynamic structure. t
7 Diusion indices for Germany have been constructed by several authors (Spietho 1955, Spree
1977, Spree 1978, Grabas 1992).
8 Hereafter, I will also use the term \diusion index" to describe the \factor," since these are
conceptually (but not econometrically) similar and economic historians are familiar with the former
expression.
3is an error term. I assume that its mean is 0, that its variance is constant, and that
there is no correlation with the specic component uit in equation 1.
The number q explicates how much correlation goes back in time. Coecients
larger than q are assumed to be zero. (If there are values fx that in fact in
uence the
value of ft, but their coecient x is zero (since x>q), q was chosen too low.) At the
same time, q should not be dened too large, since the calculation of the parameters
requires more data, which is the limiting factor in historical quantitative research.
Referring to Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 3), who postulate an average period of
eight years for business cycles, I choose q=8. For a business cycle model, this is of
course a relevant parameter choice. For the trend-cycle decomposition, I have chosen
the most common method: logarithmizing the data and using the Hodrick-Prescott
lter.9
Similar to the common component, I allow for autocorrelation of the specic
component:
uit = 1uit 1 + 2uit 2 + ::: + puit p + !it (3)
The error terms !it are not correlated in the cross section, since the common com-
ponent, by denition, re
ects the common part of all 
uctuations. Furthermore, I
assume that p, the number of lagged terms, is one.
There are some diculties with the estimation of such a model. First, there
are no observations for independent variables in equation 1. Thus I have to iden-
tify the common factor and the parameters i, the AR-coecients and the error
term's variances. This is done applying a Bayesian method which allows for de-
composing the joint distribution of these unknowns in conditional distributions.10
Since Bayesian statistics always relies on making random draws from distributions
of random parameters, an iterative procedure starts by assuming arbitrary values
and making random draws from the conditional distributions. One of the recurring
steps applies the Kalman lter to estimate the factor conditional on the parameters
i, and the distribution parameter of the error terms.11 As a side benet, results do
not just include point estimations but also quantify their particular uncertainty, e.g.
in terms of standard deviation. Moreover, error bands illustrate point estimations
and their uncertainty graphically.
I will also identify the explanatory power of the common component by calculat-
ing the coecient of determination for each series, and table it in descending order.
This will allow for discriminating between the important and irrelevant sectors in
the data set, and show which countries are represented better.
Experiences with historical data suggest that in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, industrial series are explained better by the common component while agricul-
tural series are less well explained (Sarferaz and Uebele 2009, p. 384). Thus I am
9 The respective discussion paper regarding the Hodrick-Prescott lter was published in 1980
at Carnegie Mellon University. It was published in the Journal of Money, Credit & Banking as
late as 1997 (Hodrick and Prescott 1997). See also Ravn and Uhlig (2002) for the choice of the
smoothing parameter.
10 Classical statistics using the the maximum likelehood method are applicable, too. However,
they do not use data eciently (Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman 2003, p. 1220f).
11 See Hamilton (1994, Chapter 13) for the Kalman lter and state space models.
4Table 1: Composition of country data sets
Britain France Germany
Coal/Metal 3 4 5
Textiles 3 - 3
Food 3 5 3
Transport 1 5 -
Finance - 1 2
Other 5 - 2
Real 15 14 8
Nominal 0 1 7
able to reduce the complexity of the data by identifying the series with high explana-
tory power. These should be those that are closely correlated with many of the other
series in the sample. The economic interpretation may be that manufacturing is a
vertically highly integrated sector, where the production processes include usually
more stages than in mining or agriculture. A higher average explanatory degree of
the diusion index is therefore related to an increase of the industrial output share.
There are several other methods to estimate comovement, such as the well-known
principal components analysis (PCA) (Hartung and Elpelt 2007, p. 527-533). In
contrast to dynamic factor analysis, PCA does not require any assumptions about
the structure of the data, since it is non-parametric, but this has also a downside:
the time dimension is not taken in account. PCA treats cross-sectional datasets and
time series equally. In this sense, it is a deeply ahistorical.
3 Data
The dataset contains 15 series for France, Germany and Great Britain in the period
1862-1913 (Table 1). I have used only readily available data, including time series
for France from the NBER Macrohistory Database,12, data for Germany from Spree
(1978), and the industrial production index for Great Britain by Homann (1955).13
Spree's dataset consists of 18 time series and is the foundation of his analyses of
German business cycles from 1820-1913 (Spree 1978).14 Table 1 provides an overview
about the elements of his dataset in comparison to the other two.
Homann's data from the British industrial sector starts in parts dated already
in 1700 and contains real production data of the various manufacturing sectors. The
ve \other" series in Table 1 include tobacco, paper, and leather production.
The French data set is based on several statistical publications such as the An-
nuaires Statistiques de la France and one from the Department of Transport.15 The
12 http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents
13 Spree's and Homann's series can be downloaded from http://www.histat.gesis.org.
14 Sarferaz and Uebele (2009) apply the dynamic factor model to this data set.
15 For further sources, see remarks at the Macrohistory Database.
5data set contains mostly information about the transport and food sector. Apart
from one, all data is given in real values.
The question may be asked whether diusion indices from two countries are
comparable, although they are not composed of series from the same sectors and of
the same kind.16 If comparability was not given, it would reduce the power of the
method considerably. In this case all series that are not available for both countries
would have to be deleted.
Initially, two aggregates from dierent data sounds indeed dubious. But these
concerns can be dispelled. First of all, the argument for identical data sources
assumes that each single series has a certain impact on the results. But with the
examination of the correlation between the series, the method aims to identify those
series which have a big in
uence and those which have not. A series which is hardly
correlated with the others is weighted less, and may even have no in
uence on the
aggregate whatsoever.17
Furthermore, national accounting aggregates from dierent countries use dier-
ent datasets as well { but their comparability across countries has not been ques-
tioned in the literature so far. While one of the principles of national accounting
is comparability, historical national accounting repeatedly replaces missing data by
interpolation, which has considerable eects on the cyclical characteristics, and the
data missing are of course not the same in dierent countries.18 A consequent ap-
plication of the principle \same data for all countries" would have to result in a
revision of all historical national accounting products.
It appears therefore a pragmatic approach to cautiously use all available data
to begin with, and an analysis of the composition of the factor and its economic
implications should follow. In the following, I describe the how exactly the model
is applied, and then present the results and discuss them with regard to the history
of international business cycles.
4 Research Design
The series to investigate consist of net national product (NNP) in current and con-
stant prices, as well as three single series data sets, likewise nominal and real ones.19
All series, including NNP series, are logarithmized and Hodrick-Prescott ltered in
16Broadberry and O'Rourke (2010, Ch. 4) discuss that topic.
17 For this reason, the data is not weighted ex ante, either. For instance, steel production
and sugar consumption are treated equally although it can be expected that steel is much more
important than sugar.
18 For a summarizing critique of Homann's national accounting series for Germany, see Burhop
and Wol (2005). A sophisticated comparison of the French counterparts can be found in Baubeau
and Cazelles (2009).
19 For the German NNP, I use Homann's income-based estimations by Burhop and Wol (2005,
p. 651f). Uebele and Ritschl (2009) provides a detailed reasoning for this selection. For the british
real aggregate, I use the compromise estimate by Feinstein (1972, Table 6, p. T18, column 13). For
the nominal aggregate, see Feinstein (1972, Table 1, p. T4, column 13). For the french nominal
national product, I use the NNP at factor costs by L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990, Table
A-1, p. 312, column 10). The french real aggregate can be found in Maddison (2001, p. 424-426).
For the period 1862-1870, Maddison uses his own but revised estimates from Maddison (1995), see
Maddison (2001, p. 405) for an explicit explanation.
6order to exclude long-term trends.20 The smoothing parameter is set to 6.25 (Ravn
and Uhlig 2002).
The degree of linear correlation is given by a plain correlation coecient, which
is very widespread. One may also use other methods such as frequency specic
coherency as in Uebele and Ritschl (2009), but this has the downside of making the
paper even more technical. Since the main message does not depend on this, I do
without more sophisticated correlation statistics.
I will put the emphasis on two problems related to the aggregation of historical
time series which may articially reduce cross country cyclical comovement. The
rst deals with the role of de
ating nominal NNPs. It is commonplace that nominal
NNPs tend to have a greater match than real NNPs. This is even true for data
of the same country from dierent sources, which should be exactly identical in
theory. (For example, in the more recent historiogaphical literature on Germany,
disregarding this problem has led to rather implausible results for the 1870s (Burhop
and Wol 2005).)
The second issue is that aggregating historical series along the lines of modern
accounting rules yields potentially unsatisfying results. Therefore, I use a statistical
aggregator which summarizes the common 
uctuations of a given country.
In a nal step, I develop an international diusion index. This index is based on
all 45 series and does not discriminate by country or sector, but weights the series
corresponding to their degree of mutual synchronization. By denition, this index
re
ects the \natural" maximum of international business cycle symmetry in the
given data set. It is for example possible that there are international similarities at
the sectoral level, which disappear if the data are rst aggregated at the national level
but remain informative in an international diusion index. All national aggregates,
be they from accounting or a statistical procedure, can thus be compared against
this upper limit.
The diusion index based on international data shifts the focus to another im-
portant question: Which sectors are re
ected by those series, which indicate a higher
international correlation than others? Hence, I calculate the coecient of determi-
nation of the international diusion index for each series and illustrate my results
in descending order in Table 4.
5 Results
5.1 Real and Nominal Business Cycles
Researchers distinguish between nominal and in
ation adjusted data to separate
real changes in standard of living and price eects. If national product is used as an
indicator for the standard of living, using in
ation adjusted aggregates is essential.
20 There is an intense discussion about trend ltering in the literature. Amongst others, the
Hodrick-Prescott lter applied to dierence-stationary data may generate articial business cycles
on a particular frequency, depending on how the smoothing parameter is set A'Hearn and Woitek
(2001). In this case, results are sensitive to the chosen lter. Please contact me for the respective
results.
7Most historical accounting series are constructed in current prices, and then divided
by a price index, which equals a real national product.21
The real national product is the obvious choice when investigating international
business cycles as Backus and Kehoe's famous paper demonstrates . Table 2 shows
correlation coecients between real NNPs of Germany, Great Britain and France.
While correlation between real output is positive, it is nevertheless small.22 Backus
and Kehoe (1992) indicate even less correlation between British and German Busi-
ness Cycles (0.03) for example. The dierences to Backus and Kehoe's results are
most likely due to slightly dierent observation periods and HNA-series, and un-
derline the measurement problems when it comes HND-data. Figure 1 shows the
detrended real national products: there are little similarities between the three na-
tions until 1880 but a common peak in France and Germany around 1900.
A higher correlation can be found for the nominal national products in the second
part of Table 2. German and French nominal business cycles correlate well (0.65) and
also their correlation with Great Britain is signicantly higher than in real terms.
Indeed, Figure 2 demonstrates that international business cycle comovement in the
19th century can be identied by national accounting; note for example the upswings
in the 1870s and late 1890s. The nding of these high correlations is not trivial when
considering the discussion about the problems national product estimates. It may
be a sign that a large part of the data problem may indeed be connected to the
process of de
ating output aggregates in current prices.
Another reason may be that prices correlate internationally far better than out-
put data in general.23 If so, I should nd an even higher degree of international
comovement in price indices, and the correlation of output in current prices should
lie somewhere between the cross border correlations of real output and prices, re-
spectively. This, however, is not the case for our data as part three of Table 2
indicates: For no country pair in
ation is correlated higher than the production in
current prices. As a consequence, the degree of international output correlation can
not be attributed to a simple linear combination of price and volume correlation.
Instead it seems to be due to the particular (and non-linear) combination of output
and prices indices. Looking at nominal cross country correlation may therefore be
only half-satisfying but still convey much more about international business cycle
similarity than real output evidence.
This problem gains even more relevance in the discussion about business cycles
of Germany and its neighbors in Section 4. In the case of Germany, the division
of dierent nominal NNP estimations by the same price index lead to surprising
results: They may lead to reversed cycles. Once more, this demonstrates that even
the correct application of a method can lead to deceptive results due to lack of
sucient data.
In sum, since the quality of historical price indices is highly questionable it is
a promising eld of research. The next section deals with the question which role
21 Exceptions are of course the estimates from the output side, which are calculated in real
numbers per se. Therefore this paper focuses on income and expenditure approaches.
22 Artis and Okubo (2009), Haroon, Simonelli, and Surico (2009) and Bergman, Bordo, and
Jonung (1998) present similar ndings.
23I obtained the de
ators implicitly from the respective real and nominal national product series.
8Table 2: Correlation coecients
1. Between HNA-Aggregates
in Prices of 1913
Britain France Germany
Britain 1 - -
France 0.15 1 -




Britain 1 - -
France 0.45 1 -
Germany 0.52 0.65 1
3. Between Price Indices
Britain France Germany
Britain 1 - -
France 0.35 1 -
Germany 0.42 0.44 1
4. Between National Diusion Indices
Britain France Germany
Britain 1 - -
France 0.54 1 -
Germany 0.59 0.69 1































Figure 1: Real national product 
uctuations, 1862-1913.
10aggregation methods of historical time series play in business cycle research.
































Figure 2: National product 
uctuations in current prices, 1862-1913.
5.2 Results of the Dynamic Factor Model
First, I will discuss progress in business cycle research regarding the 19th century
and their relation to my work concerning the methodology. Then, I will present the
results in chronological order.
5.2.1 Relation to other methods
Backus and Kehoe (1992, p. 876) compared real national products using correlation
coecients. They state that the low correlation they nd is mainly due measurement
errors. Table 2 shows that there are improvement opportunities when using nominal
instead of real series. A'Hearn and Woitek (2001) compare industrial output indices
instead of net national products because they state that industrial output indices
provide better indicators for cycles than national accouting. They nd a coherency
(the frequency domain counterpart to correlation) of 0.30-0.50 between France and
Britain, 0.40-0.56 between Germany and Britain, and 0.15-0.20 between Germany
and France.24
24 These ranges occur because the order of bilateral comparisons plays an important role in this
method, similar to R2.
11These are obviously quite high values for international comovement compared to
Backus and Kehoe (1992). A'Hearn and Woitek (2001) even identify higher degrees
of comovement by using certain frequency bands for their analysis. High frequencies
re
ect short cycles, while low frequencies represent long cycles. Three types of cycles
are common in literature: the Kitchin cycle (3-5 years) (Kitchin 1923), the Juglar
cycle (7-10 years) (Juglar 1889), and the Kuznets cycle (15-20 years) (Kuznets 1952).
Due to ltering described above, Kuznet cycles are already deleted. Regarding the
remaining 
uctuations, A'Hearn and Woitek (2001) suggest that a higher degree of
international comovement can be found in longer cycles than in the shorter ones.
For the Juglar cycle, they measure coherency of 0.80-0.87 for Germany-Britain,
0.44-0.47 for Germany-France, and even 0.73-0.90 for France-Britain. Hereby they
demonstrate that subsets of the national product, especially industrial production,
have a higher degree of international comovement than the national product itself.
Furthermore, these high values of the Juglar cycle may indicate that measure-
ment and aggregation errors in national product estimations and industrial produc-
tion have bigger in
uence on short cycles than on long ones, because these errors by
denition have an irregular character.
In the rest of the paper, I want to go a step further than A'Hearn and Woitek
when it comes to disaggregating the data. Instead of splitting up national products
in dierent sectors, I use the data as disaggregated as possible. The dynamic factor
model then identies international comovement in these data series whatever sector
and processing stage the goods belong to.
To identify national 
uctuations, I estimate national diusion indices, which
solely re
ect national dynamics. Part four of Table 2 re
ects the results of this
method at a glance. All values are higher than those for national products, while
the hierarchy remains the same: Germany and France have higher business cycle
comovement than Germany and Britain, while the relation between the French and
British cycle is the lowest.
5.2.2 Chronological Discussion
Figure 3 shows the three diusion indices. The scale re
ects percentage deviations
from trend. The indices themselves have no natural measurement unit, because
they are based on series such as interest rates or wages which are of dierent kind.
Therefore, I multiply the diusion index with 0.02, which is roughly the standard
deviation of a national product. It is remarkable that diusion indexes exhibit some
ups and downs clearer than national accounting series, which may indicate that the
latter articially obscure certain cycles or even spuriously dampen volatility.25
In the 1860s, there is no comovement between Germany, France and Britain.
We know from earlier research that the German business cycle arrived at its most
recent lower point in this decade in 1859 (Sarferaz and Uebele 2009, p. 381, Ta-
ble 2), and experienced a peak in 1864. It is dicult to date the British cycle in
the 1860s because it is characterized by high frequencies. French economic activ-
ity steadily increased from 1862 but slowed down already before 1869. Over the
25 The volatility of historical business cycles is subject to an intense debate of in the literature
on the US(Balke and Gordon 1989b, Romer 1989).
































Figure 3: Diusion index 
uctuations, 1862-1913.
13whole decade, France was apparently in a period of slow growth (L evy-Leboyer and
Bourguignon 1990, p. 6, Table 0.1) in contrast to Germany, which experienced
rather rapid growth. However, this analysis of Germany's business cycle in the
1860s is no consensus in literature. While Spree (1977, p. 347) identies positive
growth rates for heavy industry in the rst half of the decade, Borchardt (1976,
p. 262) states that there was a crisis-laden rst half of the decade followed by a
boom at the latest in 1869.26 According to Spree (1977, p. 351), this boom started
in 1867. The curve of my diusion index, in contrast, draws a dierent picture:
the Gr underzeit-boom started not before 1870. Corroborating evidence comes from
Burhop and Wol (2005) who identify 1864 as a peak as well. However, they nd
the following downturn to be more rapid than the one indicated by my diusion
index. In consequence, the turning point in their analysis is reached in 1867, which
rather supports Spree's ndings (Burhop and Wol 2005, p. 646).
Borchardt (1976) as well as Burhop and Wol (2005) ground their research on
the calculations of Homann (1965). In comparison, this paper is based on Spree's
data selection. In my opinion, historical national accounting aggregates are valuable
in re
ecting long run growth. For business cycle dating in the 19th century, they
are not very helpful, which the inconsistencies of rivallin German national product
estimates should be proof enough of.
The heavy slump at 1870 in the French diusion index is worthwhile to mention
(Figure 3). Taking in account the boom re
ected in Germany's index for 1871, the
results suggest a relation to the Franco-Prussian War 1870-71. The calculations
by L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990) draw a similar picture: French real na-
tional product decreases in the period 1869-1870 (Figure 1). They argue that this
decrease is mainly caused by increased government spending for war (L evy-Leboyer
and Bourguignon 1990, p. 82f), which limited more useful public investments. The
period was furthermore characterized by weak corporate prots, and below average
transport activity (L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon 1990, p. 24, Figure 1.1; p. 86,
Figure 3.2). However, focusing solely on the war as the reason for the economic
downturn is very vague, since investments and prots already decreased between
1868 and 1869. Furthermore, L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990, p. 78) argue
that the railway boom ended in 1866. Are those results consistent with my diusion
index evidence?
If we take a further look at the composition of the French diusion index, it also
shows crisis symptoms prior to the war in some of the single series it is composed
of. The series explained best by the index are goods carried by railway, inland
navigation and pig iron production (Table 4, column F). Figure 4 indicates the
stagnation of inland navigation from the early 1860s on. Moreover, the number of
goods carried by railway (Figure 5) increased slightly in the period 1866-1868 and
stopped expanding 1868 and 1869. In sum, the French economy has struggled prior
to the war. The war has worsened the situation but was perhaps not the only reason
for this struggle.
Similar to Germany's 1860s cyclical pattern, the 1870s cycle is a subject to discus-
sion. The German and French diusion indices have had their peaks in 1873, which
is well accepted in literature. The following downturn is known as the Gr underkrise.
26 The dierences to the series shown here are caused by the dierent NNP series.


























Figure 4: Inland navigation, 1862-1913.
Except for one, there is no disagreement in the more recent literature dealing with
this boom and bust pattern. Based on Homann's income estimations from the
income side, Borchardt (1976, p. 205) nds above-average growth for the period
1870-1874 and stagnation until 1880. Pig iron consumption increased by 140 per-
cent in the period 1863-1873 (Borchardt 1976, p. 262). Borchardt (1976, p. 265)
stresses the exceptionality of this crisis regarding its duration and its consequences
for the labor force, and Fischer (1985, p. 392) calls it a \severe recession."
Burhop and Wol (2005) doubt this picture. Their criticism is based on a broad
discussion and partial revisions of the four national product estimates by Homann
(1965) and Homann and M uller (1959). Their compromise estimate contradicts the
traditional view of boom and bust in the 1870s. However, Uebele and Ritschl (2009,
p. 46) argue that this cyclical pattern is a result of the de
ation of the originally
nominal series.
Homann's nominal series in Figure 6 show an anomaly. It is noticeable that the
series by Homann and M uller (1959) deviates less from its trend than the others,
especially for the period before 1890. This series is based on Prussian income tax
data and is widely seen as the most trustworthy for the level of national income.
Its small standard deviation is closely related to tax policy in Prussia: Until 1890,
personal income taxes were calculated as the average of the respective previous
three years. Thus, these series are articially smoothed. If they are divided by a
price index to arrive at real national income, countercyclical 
uctuations may result.
Since the other estimates 
uctuate more heavily in the 1870s, this eect does not
occur; cycles may be smoothed but still procyclical. The compromise estimate by
Burhop and Wol (2005), however, weights the series derived from Prussian income
tax more than the others because of its reliability. In consequence, the compromise



























Figure 5: Number of goods carried by railway, 1862-1913.
estimate re
ects the Gr under-boom as a downturn and the Gr underkrise as a boom.
Despite all criticism concerning Homann's estimations, his German business
cycle dating for the 1870s is widely accepted in literature, and its suggested dating
is also re
ected by my diusion index. Furthermore, Table 3 indicates that the
crisis in 1879 was an international one (L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon 1990, p.
25). Among others, it was accompanied by a severe harvest failure in the analyzed
countries (Veblen 1893, p. 78).
The downturn until ca. 1886 and the following boom in the three countries
is found by application of the index method.27 Results for the nominal and real
national products are consistent with this. L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1990)
mention a bank run in 1882 in France, which however had neither nationally nor
internationally a strong in
uence on the economy (L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon
1990, p. 25).
Using the index method we can identify the next crisis in the mid-1890s. Table
3 suggests crises in 1895 for Germany and France and in 1893 for Britain. Also,
national accounting dates the British crisis in 1893 (Figure 1 ).28 Obviously, the
Baring bank collapse in 1890 predated this trough. While the national in
uence on
the economy is beyond dispute, the international impact is questionable. In contrast
to the index method, the national accounting literature for Germany suggests a
turning point earlier than indicated here (Borchardt 1976, p. 267). Burhop and
Wol (2005, p. 646) argue that this crisis took place in the period 1890-1892,
because compromise estimate decreased more rapidly in 1892 than in 1895.
27 See also Burns and Mitchell (1946) for the NBER reference cycle.
28 While Feinstein (1972) identies 1893 as the beginning of the crisis, Burns and Mitchell
(1946) postulate 1894.















































Figure 6: German nominal output estimates, 1862-1913.
Table 3: Peaks and troughs according to dynamic factor model
Peaks Troughs
Britain France Germany Britain France Germany
1866 1869 1864 1869 1871 1870
1871 1873 1873 1879 1879 1879
1880 1881-3 1880 1886 1886 1886
1889 1890 1890 1893 1895 1895
1899 1900 1900 1901 1902 1902
1907 1907 1907 1910 1910 1911
1913 1912 1913
Note: As trough I dened the last year with negative
growth, as peak the last year with positive growth.
17Analyzing 171 monthly-generated time series, Grabas (1992) delivered the most
thorough analysis for Germany in the pre-World War I period. Unfortunately, her
time series covers only the period from 1895 on. Based on contemporary reports,
national accounting evidence, and the ndings by Spree (1978, 107f) and Spietho
(1955, p. 147), she dates the turning point in the end of 1893 or beginning 1894
(Grabas 1992, p. 104f). In contrast, my diusion index indicates the lower point
in 1895 and not earlier, although admittedly the decrease was slowing down since
1892 (Figure 3). The results of the French diusion index draw a similar picture.
This also contrasts the ndings of national accounting, which dates the crisis to
the years 1897 or 1896, respectively, depending on the use of real or nominal data
(L evy-Leboyer and Bourguignon 1990, p. 24, Figure 1.1).
In the rst decade of the 20th century, the three business cycles resemble each
other more than ever before. The diusion indices indicate a boom at the turn of
the century (1899 in Great Britain, 1900 in Germany and France). Although Spree
and I used the same dataset, I cannot conrm his nding that there is no boom
around 1900. I rather agree with Grabas (1992, p. 103), who identies a peak in
March 1900. Here it is once again shown that the the dynamic factor model is very
ecient in data exploitation: Although the dataset is far from optimal, international
comovement can still be identied. Since the ndings coincide with country studies
that draw on richer data, this demonstrate the superiority of the approach. The
DFM does not just identify the same boom period like Grabas but also re
ects the
downturn with its low point around 1902. The lower point was reached in France
also in 1902, whereas Britain went trough it in 1901.
In the period before the international boom around 1907, European economies
had grown only moderately. Is there another interim-cycle between 1902 and 1907
as Burns and Mitchell (1946, p. 79) argue, or was there just a period of decreasing
growth, as Grabas (1992, p. 103) suggests? Since my time series are of annual
frequency, I cannot nally decide this question. However, Grabas's contribution
seems more substantial to me, because she uses a broader dataset.
Historical national accounting indicates stronger dierences in the dating of na-
tional business cycles for this period than the diusion index method. While French
national accounting identies the same turning points as the index method does,
estimations of real national product by Burhop and Wol (2005, p. 646) and Bor-
chardt (1976, p. 267) indicate crises around 1901 for Germany and 1904 for Great
Britain (Figure 1 and 2).
In 1907, the business cycle of the three countries peaked as indicated by the
diusion index in Figure 3. Grabas (1992, p. 113) and Burns and Mitchell (1946, p.
78), who work with monthly-generated data, identify peaks in the beginning of 1907.
At the same time, the US economy was in a downturn due to a bank run (Burns
and Mitchell 1946). The lower point of this crisis was reached in 1908. It is likely
that these developments had an in
uence on the German economy, e. g. through
decreasing demand for German exports (Grabas 1992, p. 130). In Europe, the lower
point was reached signicantly later according to the diusion index (1910 in France
and Great Britain; 1911 in Germany). However, note that I dene a trough as the
last year before positive growth rates are again observed. If taking this into account,
the cycles in Europe and America can be reconciled to a large extent. For instance,
18the German index strongly declines from 1908 on and remains at a very low level.
This implies that there was a period of weak growth for a few years, which aected
other countries as well. To some extent, this observation can also be made using
national accounting. According to that, the trough was reached coincidentally in
Britain and the US (Figures 1 and 2). For Germany, contradicting dates ranging
between 1908 (Borchardt 1976) and 1909-1910 (Burhop and Wol 2005) are found,
and the French national product heavily decreased in 1910, while the diusion index
indicates a moderate upswing.
The years before World War 1 are characterized by a boom with its peak around
1913 in Germany and Great Britain, and 1912 in France. Since the war began in
the summer of 1914, this year is not part of the dataset used for this paper. In
contrast, Grabas (1992, p. 105) nds an upper turning point before the outbreak of
the war. It may be worthwhile to discuss similarities and dierences of the business
cycle prior o World War I to the crisis prior to the Franco-Prussian War 1870-71.
Finally, visual analysis of the graphs indicates comovement for France, Germany
and Great Britain, which is not limited to the diusion index but can also be found
to some extent in real and nominal national products. However, it seems that
measurement errors cause the calculation of the correlation coecients between
national products to be lower than one would expect. In contrast, when eye-balling,
the observer is able to ignore these errors, to emphasize similarities, and downplay
dierences. In principle, this is what the dynamic factor model is doing, only in
a formally well-dened sense. It maximizes the comovement of data series and
identies possible international business cycles.
5.3 The International Diusion Index
Finally, I calculate a diusion index covering common economic activity by using all
45 time series. The international diusion index shows common 
uctuations inde-
pendently from borders (Figure 7). Table 4 lists the series, which the international
diusion index is composed of. The sries are given in descending order according to
how much of their respective variance is explained by either the international index
or the country indices.
Obviously, the series related to the industrial sector are better explained by the
international diusion index than agricultural series. The best explained series is
\wholesale prices for industrial raw material" with an explained variance of 65 per-
cent, followed by the series \price of Scottish pig iron at Hamburg" with 61 percent
and the French and German coal production with 55 and 52 percent respectively.
Overall, nine out of ten of the best explained series are related to industry, trans-
port or mining, while six out of the ten worst explained are related to agriculture
or processing of agricultural goods.
The distribution listed by countries is disproportionately high dominated by
German series, followed by France. Within the rst ten series, there are six German
series, while there is just one series within the last ten. There are many French
series with less explained variance, which is mainly caused by the relatively high
amount of French agricultural series. British series are the least internationally
correlated in the whole dataset. However, I assume that including series from other




1 Germany Wholesale Prices Industrial Raw Materials 0.65 0.60
2 Germany Import Prices Pig Iron 0.61 0.45
3 France Coal Production (a01214) 0.55 0.53
4 Germany Coal Production 0.52 0.34
5 France Railroad Freight (a03007b) 0.47 0.54
6 Germany Bills of Exchange 0.44 0.13
7 Germany Pig Iron 0.40 0.54
8 Britain Ocean Shipping 0.32 0.42
9 Britain Bankruptcies 0.30 0.16
10 Germany Marriages 0.29 0.04
11 Britain Cotton Piece Goods 0.24 0.28
12 France Avg Daily Earnings (a08148) 0.23 0.11
13 Germany Bankruptcies 0.23 0.06
14 France Pig Iron (a01212) 0.22 0.49
15 France Steam Total Power (a01172a) 0.21 0.16
16 Britain Patens Granted 0.21 0.09
17 Germany Wholesale Prices Food 0.18 0.07
18 Britain Leather 0.12 0.09
19 Germany Yarn 0.11 0.00
20 Britain Beer 0.11 0.23
21 Germany Interest Rates 0.10 0.29
22 Britain Iron and Steel Products 0.10 0.20
23 Britain Tobacco Products 0.10 0.11
24 France Canal and River Trac (a03007c) 0.09 0.30
25 Britain Coal Production 0.07 0.08
26 France Railroad Mileage Under Constr (a02085b) 0.06 0.00
27 Germany Textile Investment 0.06 0.09
28 Germany Sugar Consumption 0.05 0.00
29 Britain Silk Good 0.05 0.06
30 Germany Food Production 0.04 0.00
31 France Potato Acreage (a01037) 0.03 0.03
32 Britain Paper 0.03 0.01
33 Germany Textile Prots 0.02 0.00
34 France Railroad Mileage Growth (a02086) 0.01 0.03
35 Britain Linen Goods 0.01 0.05
36 France Wheat Production (a01012a) 0.00 0.01
37 France Wine Production (a01027 0.00 0.00
38 France Wheat Acreage (a01033b) 0.00 0.00
39 France Railroad Constr Exp (a02086e) 0.00 0.00
40 Britain Copper 0.00 0.01
41 Britain Wheaten Flour 0.00 0.01
42 Britain Sugar Production 0.00 0.00
43 France Potatoes (a01017a) 0.00 0.00
44 France Increases in Railroad Mileage (a02085a) 0.00 0.00
45 Germany Labor Productivity Dortmund 0.00 0.05

















Figure 7: International diusion index, 1862-1913.
Commonwealth members as well as Scandinavian and North-American data would
result in a higher degree of international correlation of Britain.29
6 Conclusion
Up to now, national accounting was the main tool for the analysis of international
business cycle comovement in the period of the classical gold standard. Due to
methodological problems however, the presumably existing international comove-
ment has empirically not been proven, because the datasets used for national ac-
counting have neither an appropriate quality to show consistent cyclical coherence
on a national level nor to show it on an international level. In essence, this paper
outlines two major problems of historical national accounting. Firstly, the weighting,
aggregating and in parts the interpolation of time series (as common in historical
national accounting) result in a loss of cyclical information. Secondly, the knowl-
edge about short-term 
uctuations of the price level is very limited. Thus, de
ated
aggregates of national accounting are signicantly more error-prone than nominal
national products.
My ndings for Germany, France and Great Britain clearly demonstrate interna-
tional comovement, provided the adverse eect of de
ation is recognized or disaggre-
gated data sets are analyzed. To do so, I use a dynamic factor model, which weights
the particular series based on their common 
uctuations. The resulting turning
points of business cycles are consistent for several reasons. Regarding Germany, my
ndings re
ect Gr under-boom and -crisis. This dating can also be found in many
29 Regarding these considerations, c. f. Backus and Kehoe (1992, p. 876) and A'Hearn and
Woitek (2001, p. 337).
21contemporary reports as well as in the qualitative and quantitative historiographical
literature dealing with this period. Furthermore, the ndings of the dynamic factor
model are coherent with another sensitive indicator for business cycles such as the
stock market index by Uebele and Ritschl (2009). Moreover, the French example
reveals another advantage of index methods: while national accounting just re
ects
that the crisis was 1870-1871, investment series and disaggregated data indicate an
even earlier crisis. In fact, this may result in new insights on the German-French
business cycle history. In conclusion, while national accounting largely contradicts
my theoretical considerations about the level of market international integration at
the end of the 19th century, diusion indices conrm these thoughts.
The German case shows that if national accounting is applied to insucient
datasets, analysis may end up in articial business cycles. Sometimes it may even
pervert the obvious. In consequence, such analyses make a proper analysis of the
complex historical interdependencies more dicult. Following the argument that
an historical perspective on crises should bring up recommendations for upcoming
crisis, it is absolutely necessary to adapt methods to the particular circumstances,
especially to the amount and quality of available data. If this is not taken care of,
fallacies are likely to occur.
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